Presentation Details
| Fertility Signalling Games: Should Males Obey The Signal? Viktor Kovalov1, Hanna Kokko2. 1University of Zurich, Zurich Switzerland.2Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Mainz Germany |
Abstract
Game theory is used to study conflicting interests between two sexes. Males may benefit from a higher mating rate than females do. A temporal component of this conflict has been rarely modelled: females’ interest in mating may depend on when females become fertile. This sets conditions for male-female coevolution, where females may develop fertility signals, and males may benefit from discriminating them, i.e., targeting signalling females only. Modelling a temporal aspect to sexual conflict yields two equilibria: (i) an equilibrium without signals and males targeting all females, and (ii) a signalling equilibrium where all females signal before ovulation, and either some or all, males pay attention to the signal (these males leave non-signalling females in peace). Whether all or only some males discriminate depends on discriminating makes a male have an advantage in postcopulatory sperm competition. To avoid using ‘battle of the sexes’ style terminology, where one sex is a ‘winner’ and the opposite sex is a ‘loser’, we recommend describing the situation as non-signalling equilibria having stronger unresolved sexual conflict than signalling equilibria.
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No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the author.